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Abstract: Although the study of evidentiary reasoning has a long history in psychology and 
science education, much of this scholarship has focused on how people coordinate evidence 
with knowledge claims. Less attention has been paid to our notions of evidence itself and how 
these develop, especially in the context of schooling. In this symposium, presenters draw from 
scholarship in science studies and the philosophy of science, cognitive work on epistemic 
reasoning, and research in science education to unpack dimensions of evidentiary reasoning. 
Our collective focus is on identifying aspects of evidentiary knowledge and reasoning that 
prevail in scientific practice but are typically absent from classroom implementations of 
inquiry in science education. Further, the symposium will address sources of challenge for 
teachers and students as they engage with evidence in the science classroom and discuss ways 
in which educators can scaffold the development of more sophisticated reasoning with and 
about evidence. 
  
The study of evidentiary reasoning has long been a focus of psychologists and science educators. Psychologists 
interested in scientific reasoning have focused on how people develop the ability to coordinate theories with 
evidence. Science educators have examined how the design of learning environments can influence students’ 
understanding and use of evidence in contexts of argumentation and inquiry. Despite this rich history of interest, 
there is surprisingly little discussion in the literature about our notions of evidence itself. Science educators have 
typically posited that phenomena become “evidence” when connected to a knowledge claim by argument. 
Although this definition is a helpful starting point, it needs much unpacking to be useful in the design of 
learning environments. The scholarship in contemporary science studies suggests that scientific evidence is not a 
simple unitary construct but rather a rich, multidimensional construct. For example, reasoning with evidence 
involves considerations of its relevance, significance or weight, quality, and concordance with other lines of 
evidence, in relation to some circumscribed set of hypotheses or models under consideration. Scientific 
disciplines typically evolve internal methodological norms, standards, and procedures for gathering and 
evaluating evidence. For example, scientists working in a discipline share knowledge of relevant variables and 
plausible mechanisms. As part of their education, they learn how variables are typically operationalized in 
investigative designs, norms and standards for the precision and accuracy of instrumentation, experimental 
procedures, and measurement, bandwidths and density of sampling, models for aggregating and analyzing data, 
and conventions for communicating results. Both the psychological literature on scientific reasoning and the 
science education literature have neglected many of these aspects of evidentiary knowledge and reasoning.  In 
this symposium, we aim to advance research by attempting to address three core questions: 
1. What are some dimensions of reasoning with evidence that are prevalent in scientific practice but are 
mostly missing from classroom implementations of inquiry? 
2. What aspects of reasoning with evidence are most challenging for students and teachers to engage with 
in the science classroom? 
3. What are some ways we can scaffold and support students’ engagement with more sophisticated ways 
of reasoning with and about evidence? 
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This symposium will be conducted in an interactive format. The co-chairs will briefly introduce the rationale 
and core questions that the symposium will address (3-5 minutes). Each individual presentation will take 
approximately 12 minutes. Presenters will draw from their theoretical and empirical work to offer a lens for 
considering what it means to think with and about evidence in the context of scientific work. The empirical 
work that will inform the questions addressed by the symposium draws from several grade bands ranging from 
primary (Manz) and middle school (Berland & McNeill; Duncan, Chinn, & Barzilai) to secondary and post-
secondary settings (Samarapungavan, Clase, Pelaez, Gardner, & Misra). Additionally, the presenters examine 
reasoning in an array of task settings for evidentiary reasoning, including discourse about evidence in contexts 
of explanation and argumentation, reasoning with digital data such as simulations, from personal every day 
experiences of phenomena, and from data collected during laboratory investigations. Our two discussants 
(Wylie and Sandoval) bring different perspectives to the symposium. Wylie, a philosopher of science, has most 
recently engaged in a program of research (with her collaborator Robert Chapman) that examines evidentiary 
reasoning in anthropology and how the methodological norms and standards employed in the discipline allow 
anthropologists to reach consensus about evidence. Sandoval, a learning scientist, has been at the forefront of 
work on the design of science learning environments to support students’ evidentiary reasoning. During the last 
segment of the symposium, our two discussants (Wylie and Sandoval) will lead a critical consideration of the 
presentations, engage the audience in questions and discussion of the issues, and synthesize crosscutting 
theoretical and practical themes and directions for future work.  
“In real nature, does the wind blow three times?” Making the representational 
nature of evidence visible in classroom investigations 
Eve Manz, Boston University 
 
This paper addresses one important aspect of scientific reasoning that is typically left out of students’ experience 
constructing and critiquing claims and evidence—namely, the relationship between an investigation and the 
phenomenon it is meant to represent. I use a second grade landforms experiment as a context for analyzing 
student reasoning about evidence. I show how opportunities to consider how the experiment represented (or 
failed to represent) the focal phenomenon of wind and water shaping land both supported episodes of rich 
reasoning and provided challenges for teachers and students.  
 While empirical investigations have long been a focus of research, we know little about how students 
reason about the transitions represented in Figure 1 and how this reasoning might be supported in classroom 
learning environments. Whether in contexts of inquiry, or explanation and argumentation (e.g., Kuhn & Pease, 
2008; Masnick & Klahr, 2003; Toth, Suthers, & Lesgold, 2002), prior studies focus on the relationship between 
experiment and evidence, overlooking experiments’ function as a way to get a grip on aspects of the world that 
are difficult to isolate and test in situ (for two reviews, see Cavagnetto, 2010; Manz, 2015a). I conceptualize the 
relationships between evidence, explanations, and empirical work using a framework drawn from literature in 
Science Studies (e.g. Gooding, 1990; Latour, 1987) and Science Education (Lehrer & Schauble, 2006; Manz, 
2012; 2015b). Figure 1 represents these relationships using an elementary school experiment which has been 
redesigned to more accurately represent scientific work: here, the empirical investigation (placing plants in 
different light conditions to study their success) is generated to understand a complex phenomenon (a backyard 
characterized by patterns of shade and light and a corresponding distribution of plants). Observations and 
evidence are determined in light of an understanding of the phenomenon, and must be made sense of both to 
draw a conclusion about the investigation and to develop an explanation or explanatory model (here that, 
different plants are successful in different light conditions).  
 The analysis presented here focuses on a second grade landforms investigation co-designed with five 
second grade teachers by adapting lessons from a commercial science kit. The original kit did not provide 
direction for teachers to support students to think about the transitions represented in Figure 1.  In the re-
designed lessons, students first examined photographs and discussed how wind and water might shape land; 
designed investigations using straws and spray bottles to test their ideas; developed, presented and critiqued 
claims and evidence about how wind and water move earth materials; and then discussed the phenomenon again 
based on their investigations. Data collected and analyzed for all lessons included videotape of classroom 
instruction, classroom artifacts, field notes, student work, and an individual semi-structured interview with 
teachers. Analysis showed that (1) how the experiment represented the focal phenomenon was a relevant 
question for students and (2) that it influenced how they generated and evaluated evidence. First, in designing 
experiments, differences in students’ strategies for representing the phenomenon, supported the generation of 
different forms of evidence. For example, some groups squirted the spray bottles at the earth materials and used 
measures of distance the materials traveled as evidence, while others decided to first put water into petri dishes, 
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then move the water; producing forms of evidence such as floating or absorption of water. Second, students 
bounded their conclusions based on the levels of variables represented in their experiments: that is, many were 
unwilling to claim that the experiment showed that wind cannot move rocks, as there were rocks in the world 
bigger than those tested and more extreme forces of wind and water were likely to move rocks. Third, students 
questioned whether the design of experiments represented “real-world” processes. One student argued against 
his teacher’s attempt to ratify the choice to blow three times on each material by stating “Because in real life, in 
real nature, does the wind blow three times and wait for ten minutes, and then blow three times again?”  
 
  
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework for Empirical Work. 
 
   
 Opening the experiment up to these choices, tensions, and disagreements provided important 
opportunities for students to move past objectifying evidence (Sandoval & Çam, 2011) However, these openings 
also provided challenges to teachers, particularly when students sensibly argued against canonical aspects of 
evidence production that are reified in school practices. I end with a conundrum that I will explore further in the 
symposium: are some classroom experiments more useful for reasoning about evidence if we focus on the 
opportunities that emerge from their problematic aspects, rather than their function in producing “evidence” to 
support desired content understandings? What might this mean for how we design science learning 
environments and support teachers to orchestrate them?  
How can personal experiences be leveraged as “scientific evidence” In K-12 
classrooms? 
Leema Berland, University of Wisconsin-Madison, and Katherine McNeill, Boston College 
 
There is a shared understanding throughout the education world that we learn by connecting prior 
knowledge/experiences with new knowledge (NRC, 2015). In science education, this means that students should 
be enabled—nay encouraged—to bring their prior experiences into the class’ sense making discussions. 
However, this call, while easy to make and almost universally supported, has deep underlying complexities. In 
science, scientists dialogically build knowledge about natural phenomena (Ford, 2012) by manipulating 
representations of that phenomenon (Duschl, 1990). This suggests a particular definition of scientific evidence 
in which the information is both phenomena based and transformable (McNeill & Berland, 2017). 
Consequently, a tension can arise between the everyday experiences students bring to the classroom and a 
particular view of what counts as scientific evidence.  
For instance, Table 1 includes an example from two middle school students during a life science unit. 
The task asked students to analyze data from an online simulation and to choose which of two provided claims 
(Desiree’s or Abde’s) is better supported by evidence. In this conversation, we see a tension in terms of what the 
two students are using to justify their claims. Ignacio is focused on the simulation and talks about “what we’ve 
seen” and “his energy.” Ignacio is using the scientific evidence from the simulation, which consists of data. In 
contrast, Julie is focused on her own experiences with running and eating. Her language focuses on “you eat a 
lot” and “you run faster.” 
 
Table 1: An example from two middle school students during a life science unit 
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Speaker Quote 
Ignacio Well, I-I think she thinks that Desiree, uh, Desiree’s claim is the smarter one. 
Julie Desiree’s is not the smarter one. Abde’s is. 
Ignacio How? 
Julie Well, if you eat a lot before you run you just, you know, you run faster you- 
Ignacio Yeah, but what we what we’ve seen is after the three minute mark his energy starts to drop 
insanely fast. 
Julie Yeah but…if you eat a lot then more then maybe more than Abde did, then… you’ll make it to 
the end. And he got past halfway. 
Ignacio Past halfway, yeah, but Desiree still went the whole way keeping his energy up around 90%. 
 
This discussion illustrates a tension that often occurs in classrooms. We want students to be 
collaboratively connecting to their everyday resources to make sense of what is happening in the classroom. 
But, how can we dialogically build knowledge based on phenomena that we have not all experienced? How can 
they use these resources in their sense making if they do not question and interpret them? How can they fold 
these resources into their sense making so they work in concert with observations and experiences they make in 
their classroom?  In short: Is it possible for Julie’s experience to be a productive resource for sense making in 
this discussion? 
In this paper, we argue that it is possible to leverage everyday resources in ways that allow the class to 
use them as a piece of evidence as they interpret their more formal observations (what we might call scientific 
evidence). This is possible when teachers and students work with these resources in ways that are consistent 
with three design heuristics for identifying and using evidence: phenomena-based, transformable and used 
dialogically.  Table 2 uses the design heuristics to show both how Julie and Ignacio did position her everyday 
resources (we show these as italicized quotes in the table) in the conversation and how Julie, Ignacio, or a 
teacher, could have positioned them (we show this as non-italicized text). The presentation will explore this 
further, exemplifying the various ways everyday resources might be used in class discussions of evidence and 
how these discussions can be refined in ways that allow the everyday resources to be leveraged as evidence. 
 
Table 2: Example using design heuristics 
 
 Low High 
Phenomena-
based 
Information students have been told, or 
information that is not directly and obviously 
connected to experience (e.g., the hypothetical: 
“if you eat a lot before you run you just, you 
know, you run faster you”)  
Information that is based in observed 
experiences (e.g., I run a lot and I run 
differently depending on when and what 
food I eat) 
Transformable Asking students to describe what they have 
seen, or not engaging with it (i.e., Have you 
ever gone for a long run?) (We note this 
question, while not encouraging 
transformation, may set it up by shifting the 
conversation to a specific phenomenon.) 
Asking students questions that challenge 
their interpretations of the experience (i.e., 
When do you eat large meals for running – 
close to the run, the week before, etc.?) 
Used 
Dialogically 
Experiences or information that are not shared 
and not easily related to other experiences (i.e., 
Everyone’s body is different, that is what 
works for me)   
Experiences that are common enable 
students to question and challenge one 
another (i.e., emphasizing the 
commonality: “if you eat a lot before you 
run you just, you know, you run faster) 
Problematizing and expanding our conceptualization of evidence in science 
instruction 
Ravit Golan Duncan, Clark A. Chinn, Rutgers University, and Sarit Barzilai, University of Haifa 
 
Research in science education has investigated students’ reasoning with and about evidence in the context of 
evidence use in arguments to support or refute claims (e.g. Berland & McNeill, 2010), as well as use of evidence 
in constructing and evaluating models (e.g. Passmore & Svoboda, 2012). Yet we argue that despite these efforts, 
the construct of evidence remains relatively undifferentiated in the science education community and in science 
instruction. One consequence of this uniform view of evidence is that classrooms often feature evidence that is 
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epistemically simpler than evidence in science. Whereas evidence in science varies noticeably in amount, scope, 
comprehensiveness, methodological quality, robustness, technical complexity, and types of inferential 
connections to explanations, evidence in science classrooms is often simplistically used to determine whether or 
not evidence supports or contradicts a claim, and stating a reason why. 
We thus argue that there is still a need to problematize and unpack the nature and development of 
evidential reasoning. To make progress, we must complexify the construct of evidence and explicitly deal with a 
wider range of dimensions of reasoning with and about more authentic forms of evidence. We therefore propose 
a theoretical framework for reasoning with and about evidence that expands current conceptualizations of 
evidence. The main objective of this framework, which we call grasp of evidence, is to complexify the concept 
of evidence in ways that will facilitate introducing more authentic forms of evidence and more sophisticated 
ways of engaging with evidence in science classrooms. Our work builds on recent insightful analyses by 
McNeill & Berland (2017) and by Samarapungavan (in press).  
We focus on developing a grasp of evidence, which draws on Ford’s (2008) construct of grasp of 
practice. For Ford, a grasp of practice involves internalization of two interrelated roles critical for scientific 
knowledge building: constructing and critiquing claims (Ford, 2008). “Grasp” implies that the knowledge at 
hand is not purely declarative, but also includes knowledge of how to engage in critique, as well as epistemic 
justifications about why such critiques are necessary and which are relevant. Such a grasp is socially constructed 
and negotiated within a community of scientists (or learners). From a lay perspective, a grasp of evidence 
affords becoming a competent outsider, and making informed decisions about the credibility of scientific claims 
and evidence even in the absence of deep domain knowledge (Feinstein, Allen, & Jenkins, 2013). The grasp-of-
evidence framework consists of two “axes.” The first axis theorizes four dimensions that comprise grasp of 
evidence:  
 Analysis: To reason with evidence, one must first identify and comprehend its components (e.g., goals, 
methods, results, conclusion) and their interrelations. Science studies have shown the prominence of reading and 
comprehending in the work of scientists (e.g., Tenopir, King, Boyce, Grayson, & Paulson, 2005). This involves 
analysis of studies into its components, and understanding how these components fit together. 
Evaluation: The second cluster of practices involves evaluating evidence.  These are the familiar 
processes of evaluating the full range of methods used in a particular study—whether this means critiquing 
someone else’s study or thinking through how to construct studies that withstand critical evaluation.  Evidence 
evaluation is a central evidentiary practice in science (e.g., Staley, 2004).  
Interpretation: The third cluster of practices involves interpreting evidence.  These practices are also at 
the grain size of the individual study, as scientists work out how to interpret or reinterpret the results of a study 
in terms of one or more models, explanations, or theories under consideration.  Understanding the nature and 
strength of the relationships between the evidence and competing claims and models is thus a core aspect of 
working with evidence (Chapman & Wylie, 2016; Galison, 1997).  
Integration.  The fourth cluster involves integrating evidence. In science this involves a variety of 
processes for identifying bodies of relevant evidence, considering how types of research fit together to support 
one model over another, and weighing evidence in various ways (e.g., Solomon, 2015).  
The second axis of our theoretical framework derives from the AIR model of epistemic cognition 
(Chinn et al., 2014), which posits that epistemic cognition includes three central components: (A) Aims and 
value are the goals that individuals and communities set (aims), such as knowledge, and the importance of that 
knowledge (value). (B) Epistemic Ideals are the criteria used to evaluate whether epistemic aims have been 
achieved and the quality of resulting scientific products such as evidence or models. (C) Reliable epistemic 
processes are the diverse processes used to achieve epistemic aims, such as protocols for carrying out 
observations or conducting experiments, approaches to conducting meta-analyses, and so on. The framework 
involves applying the AIR model to unpack and specify the four dimensions of grasp of evidence. As an 
example, consider the evidence interpretation dimension. The core epistemic aim we associate with evidence 
interpretation is determining model validity using strong evidence. By strong evidence we mean evidence that is 
more tightly interconnected to one model and thus supports that model differentially over others. Several ideals 
can be used to judge evidence strength including its relevancy to the model in question, its ability to provide 
support (or to refute) core aspects of the model (as opposed to peripheral ones), and its diagnosticity 
(differentially supporting one model while refuting another). To meet these ideals students can engage in 
reliable processes such as careful consideration of which part of a model evidence supports, designing 
experiments that can provide diagnostic evidence, and so on. 
We argue that a framework for grasp of evidence can help educators and education researchers in at least 
three ways: (a) it can help decide how to engage students in reasoning with and about evidence; (b) it can 
provide the basis for better assessments of reasoning with and about evidence; and (c) it can suggest 
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instructional approaches that can help students develop a grasp-of-evidence.  
Deconstructing evidence: Contextualizing students’ understanding of methods 
for gathering and interpreting evidence in biology  
Ala Samarapungavan, Kari Clase, Nancy Pelaez, Stephanie Gardner, and Chandrani Misra, Purdue University  
 
In this presentation, we draw from a conceptual framework for contextualizing students’ evidentiary reasoning 
in disciplinary knowledge and practices in biology (Samarapungavan, in press) and from our recently initiated 
empirical work as part of the Exploring Biological Evidence (EBE) project (funded by the National Science 
Foundation) to address the core questions posed by this symposium. Scholarship in science studies has 
emphasized the role of shared disciplinary norms and standards for inquiry and the generation and valuation of 
evidence as a basis for scientific consensus (Chapman & Wylie, 2016; Giere, 2010). For example, Galison 
(1997) has examined how the theoretical commitments of particle physicists shape their design of experiments, 
strategies for data reduction and decisions about whether the data represent something “real” in the world. 
Psychologists and educators have long recognized that science learners may interpret phenomena differently 
from scientists because they draw on different funds of knowledge. Indeed, research in psychology and science 
education has placed considerable emphasis on this aspect of evidentiary reasoning (Lehrer, & Schauble, 2006). 
The kinds of scaffolds that have been used to support students evidentiary reasoning tend to be generic in nature. 
For example, technology prompts in WISE (a digital inquiry environment) urge students to evaluate evidence 
for “usefulness” and “relevance” as they generate scientific explanations (Kali & Linn, 2008). Educators have 
paid much less attention to the rich methodological knowledge embedded in disciplinary practice that shapes 
and constrains fruitful evidentiary reasoning for scientists. Yet it is precisely this kind of knowledge that 
becomes critical to more advanced science learning in the secondary and post-secondary years, a period in 
which US students, for example, show sharp declines in interest for and achievement in science. The EBE 
project attempts to address this gap by designing and evaluating the impact of varied types of disciplinary 
scaffolds to support students’ considerations of methodology in evidentiary reasoning. We will present 
preliminary data from our first round of implementation to illustrate how the contextualization of school inquiry 
practices in theoretical and methodological aspects of relevant disciplinary knowledge, can be used to enhance 
students’ evidentiary reasoning. Based on a synthesis of research from science studies, the psychology of 
scientific reasoning, and science education, Samarapungavan’s (in press) Conceptual Analysis of Disciplinary 
Evidence (CADE) framework highlights four broad, reciprocally related, categories of evidentiary relationships 
in scientific practice that are shaped by disciplinary knowledge. Because of space constraints, we focus here on 
the three of the four CADE categories to illustrate our approach:  
1. Theory to Evidence relationships involve the framing and articulation of potentially testable models. 
Disciplinary knowledge circumscribes and problematizes focal phenomena that scientific models are designed 
to represent and explain. These relationships come to define what counts as evidence, where we should look for 
it, and how we will collect, interpret and use it. Recent science education research has grappled with ways of 
connecting the theoretical and empirical in student reasoning and sense making during inquiry (Berland & 
McNeill, 2017; Manz, 2012; Sandoval, 2005, 2014). For example, our own prior work as well that of others 
shows that in the teaching and learning of evolutionary biology in secondary school, discussions of natural 
selection often focus on species features and behaviors that confer survival benefits, such as success at finding 
food or evading predators (Samarapungavan, 2011, Sandoval & Reiser, 2004). In contrast, little attention is paid 
to reproductive success which biologists consider to be the mechanism by which population changes occur over 
generationsy. Therefore, to support evidentiary reasoning about evolution, disciplinary scaffolds might include 
reminders to consider the specific factors needed for the preservation/transmission (or lack thereof) of traits and 
behaviors across generations of species (i.e, reproductive success).  
2. Evidence to Data relationships involve models for designing and executing investigations including 
the set up and use of instrumentation for data gathering, as well as models for aggregating and analyzing data. 
The work presented by Manz suggests that even young science learners (second graders) can begin to consider 
the extent to which their designs for gathering evidence make sense given what they know in a particular 
domain. However, these aspects of evidentiary reasoning remain problematic at more advanced levels of science 
learning. For instance, disciplinary research traditions develop contextualized internal norms and standards for 
sampling, which include knowledge of appropriate sample sizes but also such things as what intervals or range 
of values to sample. Students often have not learned (or have learned but do not remember to contextually 
employ) such disciplinary norms as they engage in inquiry. While students thinking about natural selection 
might know that they need to look at survival data over a time span rather than a single point in time, they often 
pick a time span that is too short to observe evolutionary adaptations because they do not consider the 
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reproductive cycles of a particular species and how long it will take for several successive generations of that 
species to reproduce. To support a more effective methodological framing of student inquiry from evolutionary 
data bases such as the Galapagos finch simulation (Howard Hughes Medical Institute, 2015), disciplinary 
scaffolds might explicitly prompt students to consider the time it takes for a species to produce a new generation 
of members, and to consider how many generations they would need to observe in order to draw conclusions 
about evolutionary change. 
3. Evidence to Theory relationships include disciplinary contextualizations that constrain the 
interpretation and evaluation of evidence gathered from a particular set of investigations. They involve 
evaluations of the evidence along such dimensions as the consistency of evidence across related experiments, 
strength of effects, boundary conditions, relationships to a previously established body of evidence in the field, 
or relationships to some set of disciplinary models. In the practice of science, evaluations of evidence are highly 
contextualized in disciplinary knowledge. For example, a member of our research team (Pelaez) asked 
undergraduate biology students to design an aqueous media for diluting, preserving, and observing red blood 
cells from specific animals (rabbit, cow, goose, chicken, etc.). Preliminary analyses of student work suggest they 
had trouble integrating pH and osmolyte concentration variables in their treatment of blood cells from different 
animals (Pelaez & Liu, in preparation). Later, given a table of normal blood serum parameter ranges including 
pH and osmolyte concentration measures (extracted from published research studies), they had trouble selecting 
and integrating all the relevant blood serum parameter evidence for clustering species on an evolutionary tree. In 
constructing a tree for a set of species including the birds and mammals, some compared absolute differences in 
the numerical upper value for some osmolytes with overlapping ranges, which is less meaningful than small 
differences in other osmolytes with non-overlapping ranges).  Furthermore, even those who successfully 
clustered species based on the blood serum evidence had trouble integrating all of the evidence. Many drew an 
evolutionary tree with guinea pigs and rabbits correctly clustered on a branch with a more recent ancestor than 
with a cow, but they ignored evidence for putting the chicken and goose together on another branch that shares 
an even more distant common ancestor with the rabbit, guinea pig, and cow (Pelaez & Liu, in preparation).  
Although the students were given generic prompts to consider “variability” in their data set, had learned about 
the specific osmolytes under consideration in prior coursework, and had studied the chronology of evolutionary 
processes, they did not spontaneously use disciplinary knowledge to contextualize their interpretations of the 
evidence in the lab. Disciplinary scaffolds to support students’ evidentiary reasoning in this instance would 
include prompts to first identify and explain how and why the range and distribution of serum pH and osmolyte 
values for each animal differs, second to consider what magnitude of differences in value would be considered 
significant by biologists, and third to explain their findings in terms of the chronology of evolutionary processes 
that produced diversification (Kong et al., 2017) resulting in the different mammal and bird species. Making 
such considerations explicit should help students interpret the evidence for different evolutionary relationships 
in ways that are more consistent with disciplinary norms of biology. 
Although, educators have made important strides in trying to understand and support the development 
of evidentiary reasoning in science learning, we propose that in order to support sophisticated epistemic 
reasoning in the teaching and learning of science, educators must unpack the notion of evidence itself and 
reconnect it to its disciplinary contexts. 
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